OHIO COURT REFUSES TO GRANT HEIR RELIEF FROM FORECLOSURE JUDGMENT

The Eighth District Court of Appeals recently affirmed the decision of the trial court which refused an heir’s request for post-judgment relief under Civ. R. 60(B). FIG v. Lynch, 2024 WL 3893649, ¶1 (Ohio August 22, 2024). In Lynch, the trial court granted tax certificate holder, Fig Ohio18, LLC (“the LLC”), a judgment of foreclosure against debtor (“Lynch”) and his heirs, including Lynch’s daughter (Appellant) Hollis Lynch (“Hollis”), due to their failure to pay property taxes on real property located in Fairview Park, Ohio.[i]

The sheriff served the complaint on Lynch at the property and Hollis was served via publication.[ii] Lynch never responded to the complaint, so the court entered a default judgment  against Lynch and all other defendants except Hollis.[iii] Hollis appeared pro se, filed a suggestion of death regarding Lynch, sought to intervene in the case, and asked for additional time to answer the complaint.[iv] When Hollis answered the complaint, she admitted to having an interest in the property, but she denied the other complaint allegations. Notably, Hollis did not challenge the court’s personal jurisdiction over her or otherwise challenge service of process on her or her deceased father.

The LLC moved for summary judgment against Hollis who failed to respond to the motion.[v] The trial court entered a written decision granting[vi] the LLC’s summary judgment on December 7, 2022.[vii] Instead of appealing the judgment, Hollis retained counsel[viii] who moved for relief from the judgment asserting “excusable neglect” and proffering as a defense that Hollis was not  obligated to pay property taxes on property that was solely titled in her father’s name.[ix] For the first time, Hollis also asserted service of process on herself and Lynch was improper.[x] The trial court denied Hollis’ motion for relief.[xi]

The trial court reasoned that Hollis waived the service issue by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense in her initial pleading and that her “failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment, object to the magistrate’s decision, and appeal the trial court’s judgment adopting that decision showed a disregard for the judicial system, rather than excusable neglect under Civ.R. 60(B)(1).”[xii] The court further concluded that Hollis’ motion for relief was an attempt to “collaterally attack” the judgment which she failed to appeal.[xiii] Hollis appealed the court’s denial of her motion for relief.

On appeal, the district court found Hollis had preserved the service of process issue; however, due to Hollis’ failure to provide a transcript of the relevant proceedings the appellate court was required to accept the lower court’s factual finding that Hollis was served with the summons and complaint.”[xiv] Due to this restraint, the Court concluded it could not grant relief on the basis of lack of service.[xv] The Court also concluded that Hollis failed to demonstrate the trial court’s denial of relief under Civ. R. 60(B)(1) constituted an abuse of discretion.[xvi]

The Court reasoned that Hollis had both knowledge and notice of the summary judgment proceedings and she failed to explain why she did not respond to the LLC’s summary judgment motion or appeal the judgment.[xvii] Hollis therefore failed to demonstrate excusable neglect.[xviii] Noting Hollis’ initial appearance in the case was pro se, the Court explained carelessness or unfamiliarity with the legal system did not justify relief under rule 60(B) nor could the rule be relied upon as a substitute for a timely appeal.[xix]

Finally, the Court found that relief under rule 60(B) could not be granted because Hollis did not have a meritorious defense. Contrary to Hollis’ contention, the past due property taxes ran with the land, not the landowner, so even though the land was titled in Lynch’s name, Hollis’ failure to pay the property taxes entitled the LLC to foreclose its tax lien.[xx] Although a harsh result for a pro se litigant, the district court’s decision was just and well-reasoned, and removes any incentive for litigants to seek post-judgment relief through rule 60(B) after failing to timely and adequately assert their rights during the proceedings.

[i] Lynch, ¶¶1-2.

[ii] Lynch, ¶3.

[iii] Lynch, ¶6.

[iv] Lynch, ¶¶4-5.

[v] Lynch, ¶6.

[vi] The matter was brought before a magistrate who recommended foreclosure and the trial court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate. Lynch, ¶6.

[vii] Lynch, ¶6.

[viii] The Court noted that the Legal Aid Society of Cleveland assigned an attorney to represent Hollis. Lynch, ¶7, n2.

[ix] Lynch, ¶7.

[x] Lynch, ¶8.

[xi] Lynch, ¶13.

[xii] Lynch, ¶15.

[xiii] Lynch, ¶15.

[xiv] Lynch, ¶¶20-2.

[xv] Lynch, ¶¶20-2.

[xvi] Lynch, ¶¶28-9.

[xvii] Lynch, ¶29.

[xviii] Lynch, ¶29.

[xix] Lynch, ¶30-1.

[xx] Lynch, ¶35.